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Comments and Casenotes
Is Necessity Alone Sufficient Basis For
Hearsay Exception?
By WiLmuR E. SIMMONS, JR.
Moore v. Atlanta Transit System, Inc.'
To the present day attorney, and the well-informed layman, "hearsay" invokes mixed emotions. As defined by
Professor Charles T. McCormick, "Hearsay evidence is
testimony in court or written evidence, of a statement made
out of court, such statement being offered as an assertion
to show the truth of matters asserted therein, and thus
resting for its value upon the credibility of the out-of-court
asserter."2 On the one hand the rule against hearsay "may
be esteemed, next to jury-trial, the greatest contribution
of that eminently practical legal system [the Anglo-American law of evidence] to the world's methods of procedure; '
but on the other hand, the hearsay rule with its various
exceptions has resulted in a great degree of confusion, and
has undeniably caused injustice in some cases, by preventing an adequate investigation of all facts.
Originally there was no rule against hearsay, since prior
to about the 16th century, the practice of having a jury
obtain information by consulting with informed and qualified persons who were not called into court, was generally
sanctioned. It was not until witnesses started coming into
court to testify to the jury publicly that the hearsay rule
gradually emerged. Its inception was slow and at first
hearsay statements were readily received, though often
objected to as of doubtful value. In its embryonic stage,
the hearsay rule was qualified by the practice of allowing
hearsay as confirmatory evidence, but by the beginning of
the 18th century the rule, somewhat as we know it today,
had definitely been formulated and had become settled
doctrine. 4 But the development of the rule against hearsay
has never reached a final form; numerous exceptions have
been developed which have become as accepted as the rule
1105 Ga. App. 70, 123 S.E. 2d 693 (1961), hereinafter referred to as the
Mloore case.
5, p. 460.
2 MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE (1954) §
35 WIOMORE, EViDENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 1364, p. 27.
'A full discussion of the development of the hearsay rule is found in id.,
§ 1364; also see McCoRMICK, Op. Cit. supra, n. 2, § 223 for a more brief
discussion of the history of the hearsay rule.
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itself, while other exceptions have been devised which have
received only partial recognition.
The Moore case was a personal injury action brought
by plaintiff to recover for injuries sustained by her while
attempting to board a bus belonging to the defendant,
Atlanta Transit System. The original plaintiff died, and
an amendment was filed setting out her death and substituting her temporary administrator as the plaintiff. Both sides
in answers to interrogatories stated that they knew of no
one who saw the occurrence complained of or who arrived
at the scene immediately thereafter. The defendant Transit System moved for a summary judgment, as provided
for by statute5 on the basis that there were no eye-witnesses
or persons who arrived upon the scene shortly after the
event, and that the original plaintiff was now deceased.
At the hearing on the defendant's motion for a summary
judgment, the plaintiff sought to introduce a letter from a
physician employed by the defendant to examine plaintiff's
decedent, which related the history of the accident and the
decedent's complaint, as told by the decedent to the defendant's physician.' The portion of the letter in controversy was as follows:
"'In July, 1956 I was boarding an Atlanta Transit bus
on Moreland Avenue, S.E. The bus driver closed the
door of the bus as I was entering. I was struck on the
right chest and back. This caused me to fall on steps
of bus. It knocked me out temporarily. On the same
day of the accident, I saw Dr. Huie, Glenwood Avenue.
He x-rayed my ribs and back, and I saw Dr. Huie twice
after the accident. He put a brace on me. I stayed in
bed most of the time for 4 weeks. I could not get up or
down without much pain. I did and still have a thumping pain in my back'."7
The defendant objected to the admission of this letter into
evidence on the grounds that it was "'hearsay and irrelevant, immaterial and has no connection with any allegation of negligence set out in the petition, and that it was a
5GA.

CODE ANNO. (1959) § 110-1201 to 110-1209.
' There may have been a problem of double hearsay since ithe doctor
who had written the letter was apparently not called as a witness. On
the problem of double or multiple hearsay see McCoRMsICK, op. cit. supra,
n. 2, § 226, p. 461; and 2 JONES, EVIDENCE (5th ed. 1958) § 316, p. 593.
7 Supra, D. 1, 694-695. Under modern theory self-serving declarations are
not excluded as such under orthodox hearsay exceptions; however, the
self-serving nature of such statements is significant in that required circumstantial guarantees of reliability for such hearsay exceptions as those
for excited utterances may be missing. See, McCORMICK, op. cit. supra,
n. 2, § 275, pp. 588-589.
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self serving declaration'."' The lower court sustained the
defendant's objection and refused to allow the letter into
evidence. When the plaintiff indicated that the only evidence he possessed consisted of statements made by the
decedent to doctors and various other persons, the trial
judge granted the motion for a summary judgment. It was
from this ruling that the plaintiff took his appeal.
The Court of Appeals of Georgia, held:
"[T]he declarations of a decedent.., to whomsoever
made are admissible in evidence if there are no other
witnesses to the alleged occurrence. 'Other witnesses'
within the meaning of this rule would include eyewitnesses, whether favorable or unfavorable to the
party offering the evidence, but would exclude those
who merely testify that they did not see the alleged
occurrence .... Thus, we hold that the statement was
admissible ....
[A]nd it is for the jury, under appropriate instructions, to determine its weight and credibility."9
In discussing the purpose and reasons for the various
exceptions to the hearsay rule, Wigmore considers two
factors to be controlling: (1) a circumstantial probability
of trustworthiness (reliability), and (2) necessity. 10 The
8
9

Supra, n. 1, 695.
Supra, n. 1, 701.
05 WIGMORE, op. Cit. 8upra, n. 3, §§ 1420-1422.
"§ 1421. First Principle: Necessity. The scope of the first principle
may be briefly indicated by terming it the Necessity principle. It
implies that since we shall lose the benefit of the evidence entirely
unless we accept it untested, there is thus a greater or less necessity
for receiving it. The reason why we shall otherwise lose it may be
one of two:
(1) The person whose assertion is offered may now be dead, or
out of the jurisdiction, or insane, or otherwi8e unavailable for the
purpose of testing. This is the commoner and more palpable reason.
(2) The assertion may be such that we cannot expect, again or
at this time, to get evidence of the same value from the same or
other sources. * * * Here we are not threatened (as in the first case)
with the entire loss of a person's evidence, but merely 'of some
valuable source of evidence. The necessity is not so great; perhaps
hardly a necessity, only an expediency or convenience, can be predicated. But the principle is the same." (Emphasis by Wigmore).
"§ 1422. Second Principle: Circumstantial Probability of Trustworthiness. The second principle which, combined with the first, satisfies
us to accept the evidence untested, is in the value of a practical
substitute for the ordinary test of cross-examination. We see that
under certain circumstances the probability of accuracy and trustworthiness of statement is practically sufficient, if not quite equivalent
to 'that of statements tested in the conventional manner. This circumstantial probability of trustworthiness is found in a variety of
circumstances sanctioned by judicial practice; and it is usually from
one of these salient circumstances that the exception takes its name.
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orthodox hearsay exceptions, including those which are
likely to be available in factual situations similar to that of
the Moore case, require, to at least some degree, both
necessity and reliability. For example, in the hearsay exception for declarations of present bodily condition 1 there
is an element of necessity in that "though the person's testimony on the stand may still be both actually and conveniently practicable, yet the probability of there receiving
from him testimony which shall be in value equal or superior to certain hearsay statements is small...."- The accompanying element of reliability is said to exist "by the
spontaneous quality of the declarations, supposedly assured
by the fact that the declarations must purport to describe
a condition presently existing at the time of the declaration;"'" though it is recognized that reliability is doubtful
"since some of such statements purporting to describe
present symptoms or the like are not spontaneous but are
calculated mis-statements."' 4 In the standard hearsay exception for statements made to physicians consulted for
treatment, there is an element of reliability in that the
declarant knows that the accuracy of the statements which
he gives to the physician will to a large extent determine
the value and usefulness of the treatment which he will
receive."5 In the exception to the hearsay rule recognized
for excited utterances," there is a factor of reliability "furnished by the excitement which suspends the powers of
reflection and fabrication.'1 7 Even in the case of contemThere is no comprehensive attempt to secure uniformity in the degree
of trustworthiness which these circumstances presuppose. It is merely
that common sense and experience have from time to time pointed
them out as practically adequate substitutes for the ordinary test, at
least, in view of the necessity of the situation."
1E.g., in Munden v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 213 N.C. 504, 196 S.E.
873, 874 (1938) a statement by the deceased that he "felt bad" was held
to be admissible. The Court stated "'filt is very generally held that, when
the physical condition of a person is the subject of inquiry, his declarations as to his present health, the condition of his body, suffering and
pain, etc. are admissible in evidence'."
16 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 1714, p. 58. Also see McCoRMcic,
op. cit.
8upra, n. 2, § 265, pp. 561-562.
2MCCORmicK, op. cit. supra, n. 2, § 265, pp. 561-562.
1 Id., 562.
Id., § 266, p. 563.
"E.g., in the case of Lambrecht v. Schreyer, 129 Minn. 271, 152 N.W.
645, 646 (1915), the testimony showed that defendant struck the plaintiff's
horse with a whip causing the plaintiff's team to strike a stump. The
plaintiff, his wife, and three children were thrown or dragged from the
carriage. One of the daughters while still frightened from the occurrence,
told her mother: "Schreyer struck our horses." It was held that the
evidence was admissible.
17 McCoRMIcK, op. cit. 8upra, n. 2, § 272, p. 579. Also see 6 WIGMORE,
op. cit. supra, n. 12, §§ 1745-1764.
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poraneous utterances, recognized in some jurisdictions as
forming an exception to the hearsay rule, when there is no
exciting event," there is reliability in that: first, the declaration occurs at the time the event is perceived so that
there is no doubt as to the memory of the declarant; secondly, there is no time to reflect upon the statement before
it is made; and third, the statements are generally made
in the presence of others who can act as a check upon any
misstatement. 9 Declarations against interest clearly rest
upon a theory of reliability in that, as stated by Wigmore,
"The basis of the Exception [declaration against interest]
is the principle of experience that a statement asserting a
fact distinctly against one's interest is unlikely to be deliberately false or heedlessly incorrect, and thus sufficiently
sanctioned, though oath and cross-examination are wanting."2 It would seem that the only standard exception to
the hearsay rule which may be present in factual situations
similar to that of the Moore case, that does not appear to
require at least some element of reliability, is the exception
recognized for admissions of a party-opponent. Although
commonly admissions are against the interest of the partydeclarant when made as well as contrary to his trial position, as stated by McCormick: "the party is not even required to have had first-hand knowledge of the matter declared, and the declaration may have been self-serving
when it was made."'" This exception ultimately rests upon
estoppel and the feeling that "it does not lie in the opponent's mouth to question the trustworthiness of his own
declaration ..... -1 In fact, he is generally able to take the
stand and explain away the admission if he wants to. Thus
it is fairly apparent that even though reliability may be
doubtful in particular cases, by in large, in most of the
standard exceptions, there is some element of reliability,
in addition to necessity, which makes inaccuracy less likely
to occur.

I E.g.. Houston Oxygen Co. v. Davis. 139 Tex. 1. 161 S.W. 2d 474, 140
A.L.R. 868 (1942). In this case a declaration of an observer of erratic
driving of another car, later involved in an automobile accident, made while
the car in which the plaintiff was riding was passing, that "they must
have been drunk, that we would find them somewhere on the road
wrecked" was held to be admissible as -a declaration of present sense
impressions.
10McCoRMicK. op. cit. supra. n. 2, § 273, P. 584. See Morgan. A Sugqes.ted
Classiflcation of Utterances Admissible as Res Gestae, 31 Yale L.J. 229,
236-239 (1922).
20 .;
WiGMfoHE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940), § 1457, pp. 262-263.
21McCoamic, op. cit. supra, n. 2, § 239. p. 502. See also Morgan. Admissions as an Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 30 Yale L.J. 355 (1921).
1McCoiAiicK, op. cit. supra, n. 2, § 239, p. 503.
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An examination of the Moore case clearly reveals that
the declarations there in question did not fit under any of
the orthodox hearsay exceptions discussed above. The
declaration involved in the Moore case could not be considered a declaration of present bodily condition since the
statement related to the past, how the accident occurred
and the treatment the declarant had received, not merely
the declarant's then present bodily condition. 3 The declaration could not be considered a statement to a physician
for treatment, so far as that exception to the hearsay rule
is concerned, since it was made to the defendant's doctor,
apparently for purposes of litigation or to establish a claim
against the defendant, not treatment.2 4 It is beyond doubt
that the declaration could not be considered an excited or
contemporaneous utterance since the declarations were
made well after the injury occurred.2 5 Nor can the statement be considered a declaration against interest since it
was clearly self-serving26 or an admission since there were
no words or acts of the declarant offered in evidence against
her." Thus it can be concluded that the declaration involved in the Moore case did not fit under any of the orthodox exceptions to the hearsay rule which are likely to be
available in similar factual situations.
There are some cases in which, due to the fact that
there is an element of both reliability and necessity, hearsay evidence has been received even though not falling
under an orthodox exception. For example, in Dallas
County v. Commercial Union Assurance Co. 28 the Court
allowed a fifty-eight year old newspaper account of a fire
to be received into evidence even though it was hearsay
and did not supposedly come under any orthodox exception.
The Court said:
"We do not characterize this newspaper as a 'business
record' nor as an 'ancient document', nor as any other
readily indentifiable and happily tagged species of
hearsay exception. Itis admissible because it is necessary and trustworthy, relevant and material and its
WIGMORE, loc. cit. supra, n. 12.
MCCORV.TCR, op. cit. supra, n. 2, § 266. The Georgia Court of Appeals
pointed out this factor: "The statement here offered, though made to a
doctor, was not made with a view of obtaining treatment by him, but
was made to one who was to examine the declarant and evaluate her
condition for the Transit System, against whom she had a claim for
damages." Supra, n. 1, 701.
McCoRmIcK, op. cit. supra. n. 2, §§ 272-273.
WIGMORE, loc. cit. supra, n. 20.
McCoRMiCK. op. cit. supra.n. 2,§ 265.
1286 F. 2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961).
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admission is within the trial judge's exercise of discretion in holding the hearing within reasonable
bounds."29 (Emphasis added.)
When courts have gone outside the usual orthodox hearsay
exceptions, to allow hearsay to be received into evidence,
they almost invariably state that they do so because of
necessity and because there is some element of reliability
or trustworthiness present,"0 but the Moore case purported
to rest on necessity alone. And in fact, it could not rest on
any element of reliability, for there seems to be no reason
for supposing that a self-serving statement made with an
eye to litigation is especially likely to be accurate.
II
The above comment on the holding of the Moore case
should not be taken to indicate that there is no room for
relaxation of the hearsay rule in appropriate cases. There
may well be occasions when, for reasons of policy, an exception to the hearsay rule should not require reliability in the
sense of the orthodox exceptions to the rule. Arguably, the
reliability requirement should be dropped altogether. It is
the function of this section to examine some of the possible
positions which might be taken in weakening or eliminating
it. The doubtful propriety of basing an exception to the
hearsay rule on necessity alone is suggested by the fact that
even when courts say they recognize an exception primarily because of necessity, they have nevertheless hopefully
looked for reassuring factors tending to give some promise
of reliability.
One situation in which necessity has resulted in liberalization of the hearsay rule is where statutes have been
passed to protect certain classes of persons under special
circumstances. In such cases there are often strong reasons,
based on both necessity and policy, why the common law
rules of evidence with all their ramifications should not be
applied. The clearest example would be workmen's compensation legislation. Although there is authority to the contrary, the usual view is that the strict common law rules of
evidence, including the hearsay rule, should not be applied
in workmen's compensation proceedings.8 1 In such proceedings there is a legislative policy favoring liberalization of
" Id., 397-398. (Emphasis added).
Infra, part II.
U12 SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION TEXT (3d ed. 1959)
p. 276-277.

§ 2526,
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the rules of evidence to avoid defeating the purpose of the
act, "which is to permit claims to be proven in a simple,
direct and summary manner consistent with justice to both
sides. 13 2 But this is not to suggest that in such administrative proceeding the hearsay rule can be disregarded.
"While hearsay evidence is sometimes admissible in
compensation proceedings, it may be given probative
effect only if corroborated by a residuum of common
law evidence. This rule governs when the party
against whom the award is made does not question the
sufficiency of the proof. The majority rule . . ., is
'Courts will not permit awards to stand which are
based on hearsay evidence uncorroborated by facts,
circumstances or other evidence.' A fact finding may
not be based solely upon hearsay evidence." 3
Thus even in regard to workmen's compensation cases,
where there is a legislative policy toward liberalization of
the rules of evidence, the hearsay rule is not to be relaxed
to the extent that a finding can be based solely on hearsay,
without corroborating evidence. This would seem to be
simply a recognition that the trustworthiness or reliability
requirement is present in some form even when a relaxation of the restrictions against hearsay is necessitated by
public policy. 4
An overlapping area in which an attempt can be made
to base an exception to the hearsay rule upon necessity
alone is found in the so-called solitary workmen cases.
These cases, which are often workmen's compensation proceedings, usually involve fatal accidents to solitary workmen. The rationale of these cases is that there being no
eyewitnesses, statements made by the workman prior to
his death are the only means of determining how the accident occurred. Thus there is a high degree of necessity for
receiving such statements into evidence even though they
involve hearsay. One method which has been used to permit the admission of such evidence, is "'a liberal interpre= Ibid.
§ 2533, p. 317. Of. 2 DAVIs ADMIIm-TSATIVS LAW TREATISE (1958),
ch. 14. pp. 250-337, wherein the author maintains that the trend is away
from the rigidity of the exclusionary rules, especially in non-jury cases.
"For examples of the operation of the hearsay rule in Maryland wbrkmen's compensation cases see Standard Oil Co. v. Mealey, 147 Md. 249.
127 A. 850 (1925) and Beth. Steel Co. v. Ziegenfuss, 187 Md. 283, 49 A.
2d 793 (1946). Also see 23 M.L.E. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, § 214,
p. 286.
8Id.,
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tation of the res gestae rule'."33 The leading case for this
approach to a relaxation of the hearsay rule is Jacobs v.
Village of Buhl,36 wherein the court said:
"In the larger cities of this state there are many policemen walking their beats alone, day and night. In every
small city and hamlet there is a policeman working
alone at night. Night watchmen work alone. Other
employees work alone. These employees are subject
to numerous possibilities of accidents which may cause
conditions that may bring about their death. They do
not have a witness with them to furnish proof as to
the happening of an accident if the injuries they receive close their lips in death. The number of compensation cases which reach the courts of last resort
where the only proof of the accident is the declaration
of the injured employee give weighty proof of the
truth of the declaration of the Pennsylvania court that
to give a strict application of the res gestae rule in
compensation cases would defeat
the intent of the
'37
Workmen's Compensation Law.
The exception sometimes made in the solitary workmen
cases, however, may, at least in some instances, be justified
8 McCoRmiCx, op. cit. supra, n. 2, § 272, p. 584. fBut the use of the

term "res gestae" probably does more harm than good. It includes, among
other -things, the hearsay exceptions for spontaneous and contemporaneous
utterances, declarations of present bodily condition, and statements to
physicians for purposes of treatment. Supra, § 274.
"The discussion of several doctrines has been commonly carried on,
In judicial opinion, with more or less use of the phrase 'res gestae'
as the name of a doctrine under which certain kinds of evidence
receive sanction. This phrase, as conceded on all hands, is inexact and
indefinite in its scope, and is ambiguous in its suggestion of reasons
for the doctrine .... " 6 WIOMORE, EVIDECE (3d ed. 1940) § 1767, p. 180.
"The term res gestae, which the court used to justify the admission of the evidence, originally arose as more or less of an historical
accident. It is a vague expression which Is now commonly used by
courts through custom and habit, as a reason for permitting many
varieties of subject matter to be placed in evidence. Condemned by
leading writers and students of the law, the term lingers on to the
annoyance of those persons who seek to explain the admission of
items of evidence upon logical grounds, based on clearly defined
reasoning." 22 Minn. L. Rev. 391, 392, in commenting on the case of
Jacobs v. Village of Buhl, 149 Minn. 572, 273 N.W. 245 (1937).
It should be noted that the Georgia Court of Appeals in the Moore case
expressly stated that it was not relying on the res gestae doctrine in
reaching its decision, saying at page 702: "We do not bottom this ruling
on the res gestae principle. While the utilization of this principle is often
proper, its mere intonation has no magical effect and cannot be used as a
catch-all for difficult cases."
149 Minn. 572, 273 N.W. 245 (1937). See also 'Butler v. WashingtonYouree Hotel Co., 160 So. 825 (La. App. 1935) and Thompson v. Conemaugh
Iron Works, 114 Pa. Super. 247, 175 A. 45 (1934).
Id., 247.
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under one or more of the standard or "res gestae" exceptions discussed previously in part one. Thus if the statement of such a workman is made to a physician consulted
by the employee for treatment purposes, the hearsay statement could be admissible as a statement to the physician
made for purposes of treatment, so long as it did not go
beyond bodily condition into the realm of liability.3" Of
course, if the statement was not self-serving or a mere
neutral statement, it might be admissible as a declaration
against interest, 9 but, because there is usually a lapse of
time between the accident and the statement, the exceptions for excited utterances 4° or contemporaneous utterances, 41 would generally not be available in the solitary
workmen cases. At first glance it might appear that the
statements of such workmen may fit under the exception
recognized for declarations of present bodily pain and condition,'4 2 but it is necessary to distinguish statements of
present condition from statements as to past cause, and it
is the latter with which we are herein interested.
While the hearsay rule is relaxed in the solitary workmen cases because of necessity, as previously intimated,
the requirement of reliability through circumstantial evidence of trustworthiness, has not been ignored. As stressed
in the Jacobs case:
"A consideration not to be disregarded in passing upon
this case is the fact that there was an entire lack of
motive for the deceased to misrepresent at the time
he told of having received the injuries. His injuries
did not appear at that time to be serious. Death from
his injuries was probably the last thing he was thinking
about. It is doubtful if at that time he had the least
thought in his mind that his injuries would
even re'4
quire an application for compensation.
The assurance of reliability here is merely negative; in the
court's opinion, there is no reason to suppose the declarant's
statement is incorrect; it is neither significantly self-serving
nor significantly against interest. Where the statement is
neutral, it would seem wise to recognize an exception in
the solitary workmen cases since, as stated previously, the
McCoRMIcK, EvrmENcE (3d ed. 1940) § 266.
WIGMORE, 1o. cit. 8upra, n. 20.
,0McCoRMIcK, op. cit. supra,n. 38, § 272.
"Morgan, A Suggested Cla88iflcation of Utterances Admissible As Res
Ge8tae, 31 Yale L.J. 229, 236-239 (1922).
" McCORMICK, op. cit. 8upra, n. 38, § 265.
'

Supra, n. 36, 249.
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statements made by the workmen prior to their deaths
may be the only means of determining how the accident
occurred.
This idea might be extended to permit reception of such
hearsay in any kind of case in which the only available
evidence is the declaration of a neutral eyewitness who,
for some reason such as death or insanity, is not later available to testify. In addition to the high degree of necessity
there would be an element of reliability because of the
non-interest of the witness. This situation could be regarded as an extension of the standard exception for declarations against interest4 4 wherein a hearsay statement of a
declarant is admitted if it is against his interest, due to
presumed reliability, but is rejected if neutral or selfserving since the presumed reliability would not be present.
To go beyond this point, for example to allow the hearsay statements of the plaintiff's decedent to be received
merely because the declarant is unavailable, apart from any
special considerations, would reduce the hearsay rule to
a mere rule of preference" rather than a rule of exclusion.
Of course, if a rule of preference were adopted, there would
be no need to find reliability since the only showing required would be that first-hand evidence was not available.
Another approach to the problem may lie in statutory
liberalization of the hearsay rule. 6 For example, there has
been a statute in Massachusetts since 1898 which in its
present form provides:
"Declarations of Deceased Persons. In any action or
other civil judicial proceeding, a declaration of a
deceased person shall not be inadmissible in evidence
as hearsay or as private conversation between husband and wife, as the case may be, if the court finds
that it was made in good faith and upon the personal
' ' 47
knowledge of the declarant.
A similar statute has been enacted in Rhode Island:
"A declaration of a deceased person shall not be inadmissible in evidence as hearsay if the court finds that
"WIoMoRB, Wo. Cit. supra,n. 20.
That is, evidence which is hearsay would be received if it was the
only evidence available, but if non-hearsay evidence was available, it
would be given priority over the hearsay. Under a rule of exclusion,
hearsay Is rejected unless it comes under a recognized exception, regardless of whether or not other evidence Is available.
2 JONES, EviDE1c (5th ed. 1958) § 274, p. 527; 5 WIGMoRE, EVMuNcE
(3d1 ed. 1940) § 1567, p. 435.
'7MASS. ANNO. LAWS (1956) ch. 233, § 65.
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it was made in good faith before the commencement
of the action and upon the personal knowledge of the
declarant."4 s
These statutes would attempt to solve the problem
raised in the Moore case by receiving statements of deceased persons into evidence when there is a strong necessity, and the statements are found to have been made (1)
in good faith and (2) upon the personal knowledge of the
declarant. These statutes do not eliminate the reliability
factor, since good faith and knowledge at least intimate an
element of reliability. However, the class of problems presented in the Moore case can at least be alleviated by a
proper statute in the case of the deceased declarant.4 9
Thus the difficulty of treating necessity in and of itself
as sufficient to form an exception to the hearsay rule should
be rather apparent. Even in cases where there is some
special reason, such as public policy, for relaxing the application of the hearsay rule, to disregard the element of
reliability, as the Georgia Court did in the Moore case,
actually calls for a complete change in the basic structure
of the hearsay rule.
III
The Court of Appeals of Georgia in the Moore case
cited numerous cases in support of its holding, but seemed
to rely mainly on six prior Georgia cases which had similar
factual patterns, but which in light of the foregoing discussion could have been distinguished. 50 The Mutual Life
0 GEN. LAWS OF R.I. (1956) § 9-19-11.

"There is no apparent reason why such statutes cannot be extended to
cover cases where the declarant is unavailable for some reason other than
death.
"With reference to the general advisibility of modifying the
exclusionary rule so as to make some hearsay declarations admissible which do not now fall under any recognized common law exception, it is difficult to justify a distinction between unavailability of
the declarant because of death, hnd unavailability because of insanity,
or his absence in good faith, beyond the court's powers, or some
other reason." JONES, Op. cit. 8upra, n. 46, pp. 528-529.
10(1) Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York v. Davis, 48 Ga. App.
742, 173 S.E. 471 (1934). The Court upheld the admission into evidence
of a statement made by the decedent to his doctor, that he "had a
shake-up in a Ford car" when suit was brought by the decedent's wife
on an insurance policy to recover under a double indemnity clause. The
Court, at p. 472, said "We think, however, that the statement was
admissible as a matter of necessity and to show the basis of the testimony or the reasons for the expert evidence of the doctor in reference to
the cause of death of the insured." (Emhpasis added).
(2) Lathem v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 60 Ga. App. 523, 3
S.E. 2d 916 (1939). Statements made by the decedent to his physician
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Insurance Co. 5 case can easily be distinguished since it gave
an alternative non-hearsay ground for admission of the
statement involved. In regard to the other five cases it
should be noted that all were workmen's compensation
cases. The defendant in the Moore case attempted to persuade the court that these cases were distinguishable on the
grounds that more liberal rules of evidence apply to workmen's compensation cases. But the Court expressly rejected "the idea that there is a distinction in the rules to
be applied to workmen's compensation cases."5 2 The failure
to make this distinction would seem to be clearly contra to
the usual view, even though workmen's compensation statutes do not always expressly provide for a liberalization of
evidentiary rules. 53 Maryland, for example, has recognized
that hearsay statements are admissible in the discretion of
4 though
the court in workmen's compensation proceedings,
55
caution.
great
they should be received with
As has been previously shown, the authorities in the
Anglo-American law of evidence generally base the various
exceptions to the hearsay rule upon the grounds of necessity and reliability." Though the concept is weakened in
as to how he was injured were received into evidence because of necessity
and because they were inseparable from the decedent's complaint with
respect to his injury.
(3) City of Atlanta v. Crouch, 91 Ga. App. 38, 84 S.E. 2d 475 (1954).
Various complaints of pain made by the decedent to his son-in-law and
statements as to the cause of his pain were held to be admissible and
competent evidence as to how the injury occurred.
(4) Flemming v. St. PaulaMercury Indemnity Co., 91 Ga. App. 582, 86
S.E. 2d 637 (1955). This workmen's compensation case held that the
evidence authorized a finding that an injury was compensable, even
though the only evidence as to how ;the accident occurred was a statement
by the deceased workman to his wife that he had stepped on a pipe
where he was working.
(5) Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Wright, 92 Ga. App. 224, 88 S.E. 2d
205 (1955). A wife was allowed to testify as to her deceased husband's
expressions of pain and his statement as to how the accident occurred.
(6) Smith v. U.S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 94 Ga. App. 507, 95
S.E. 2d 35 (1956). Decedent's wife and her friend were allowed to
testify as to statements concerning the injury made to them by the
decedent, although this evidence was found to be outweighed by a statement to a doctor by the decedent, that he was not injured.
"Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York v. Davis, 48 Ga. App. 742,
173 S.E. 471 (1943).
" Moore v. Atlanta Transit System, Inc., 105 Ga. App. 70, 123 S.E. 2d
693, 697 (1961).
SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION TEXT (3d ed. 1959) § 2533, p.
317.
"Beth. Steel Co. v. Ziegenfuss, 187 Md. 283, 49 A. 2d 793 (1946):
Standard Oil Co. v. Mealey, 147 Md. 249, 127 A. 850 (1925).
1 Spence v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 173 Md. 539, 197 A. 302 (1938).
'
WIGMORE, op. cit. supra, n. 46, §§ 1420-1422. Even the Uniform Rules
of Evidence, which are generally regarded as being liberal, impose a
reliability requirement while recognizing an exception on the ground of
necessity generally, in that they require that the deceased declarant
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the workmen's compensation cases, 57 in the exception recognized for admissions of a party, 58 and even through "a
liberal interpretation of the res gestae rule,"59 these two
factors are undoubtedly the backbone of the orthodox exceptions to the hearsay rule. Thus the uniqueness, and perhaps the fallacy of the Moore case is this: a self-serving
statement as to cause, which was hearsay and which did
not fit within any orthodox exception to the hearsay rule,
was admitted into evidence solely on the basis of necessity,
without regard to the fact that there was no direct or circumstantial evidence of trustworthiness or reliability, and
such a statement, even though standing by itself, was considered sufficient to support a verdict for the plaintiff under
appropriate instructions.
To permit hearsay statements to be received into evidence solely because of necessity, seemingly without regard
to any element of trustworthiness or reliability, seems to
make the hearsay rule a simple rule of preference, rather
than a rule of exclusion ° as it is generally regarded in the
Anglo-American law of evidence. However, there may be
some merit to such an approach, since some testimony may
be better than none at all, and perhaps the jury can be
trusted, under proper instruction, to be sufficiently cautious. After all, it is only the Anglo-American judicial system where a rule of exclusion is applied to hearsay evidence."' In most European countries the usual view is that
had "recently perceived" the matter about which he made the statement
in question, and that it be made "while his recollection was clear [and]
in good faith prior to the commencement of the action."
"Hearsay Evidence Excluded - Exceptions. Evidence of a statement which is made other than by a witness while testifying at the
hearing offered to prove the truth of the matter stated Is hearsay
evidence and inadmissible except: * * *
(4) Contemporaneous Statements and Statements Admissible on
Ground of Necessity Generally. A statement (a) which the judge
finds was made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition which the statement narrates, describes or explains, or (b)
which the judge finds was made while the declarant was under the
stress of a nervous excitement caused by such perception, or (c)
if the declarant is unavailable as a witness, a statement narrative
describing or explaining any event or condition which the judge
finds Was made by the declarant at a time when the m'atter had been
recently perceived by him and while his recollection was clear, and
was made in good faith prior to the commencement of the action."
(Emphasis added). UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE, Rule 63.
Supra, n. 31.
MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 239, p. 502.
Supra, n. 35.
0 Supra, n. 45.
11"[I1t has long been customary in this country [England] to emphasize
that the rule excluding hearsay is one peculiar to English law and finds
no counterpart on the continent [i.e. Europe]." H. A. Hammelmann.
Hearsay Evidence, A Comparison, 67 L.Q.R. 67 (1951).
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hearsay may be received into evidence, although it seems
that the judges are free to disregard it "or give it any little
weight which it seems to deserve." 2
There is a possible intermediate position between a pure
exclusion rule and a pure preference rule; that is, make
the hearsay rule one of preference, so that evidence such
as that involved in the Moore case could be received, but
require corroboration as to doubtful facts before permitting
the court or the jury to decide for a hearsay proponent
who has the burden of persuasion. Such a rule would prevent the harshness of blanket rejection of hearsay under
the exclusion rule, but at the same time would not allow
a verdict to be based solely on hearsay. It would prevent
the rather unfortunate result in the Moore case where the
verdict was rendered for plaintiff solely on uncorroborated,
self-serving hearsay. Under such an intermediate position,
the verdict in the Moore case would have to be rendered in
favor of the defendant absent corroborating circumstances,
but the evidence in question would have been received.
However, if the rule of exclusion is considered to be too
deeply intrenched in Anglo-American jurisprudence to be
uprooted, as it would seem to be, there is yet another solution which is quite simple but would appear to solve fairly
the problem of allowing hearsay to be received when no
other evidence is available. If the standard hearsay exception for declarations against interest were broadened to
permit reception not only of statements against interest, but
also unsuspicious neutral statements, 3 the general rule of
exclusion of hearsay testimony could be maintained. At
the same time the problem of receiving hearsay in some
situations analogous to that of the Moore case would be
alleviated. In conclusion, this modification would seem to
be particularly desirable since in most situations it would
fairly solve the problem under discussion, but at the same
time would preserve the standards of necessity and
reliability.
Lord Mansfield in the Berkeley Peerage Case, 4 Campbell, 401, 415,
171 Eng. Rep. 128, 135 (1811). Also see supra, n. 61.
Cf. UNIFonam RuLE OF EvIDEXCE, 63(4) (e).

